Abstract: Few the or etical insigh ts h ave em er ged from the extensive literature di scussions of pe titio pr incipii ar gument. In par ticular, th e pattern of petitio analysis has lar gely been on e of movem ent between the two sides of a di chotom y, th at of form and content. In this paper, I trace the basis of thi s d ichot omy to a du alist conce p tion of mind and world . I argue for the rejection of the form/conten t di chotom y on the ground that its dualist presuppositions gellerate a reductioni st an alysis of cer tain concepts which ar e cen tral to th e analysis of petitio argumen t. I contend, for exam ple, th at n o syn tactic relation can assimil at e within its analysis the essentially holistic n ature of a notion like justification. In this regard, I ex pou nd a form of dialectical criticism which has been frequently employed in th e philosop hical arguments of Hilar y Putnam. Here the focus of an alysis is upon th e way in which the propo ne n t of a position pr oceed s to explain 0 1' argue for his/h er own pa r ticula r theses. My conclusion poin ts to th e u se of such dial ectic within fu tu re analyses of petitio pr incipii.
In re cent years, Putnam has ' exhibited a philosophical preoccupation with issues of unintelligibility , such as they rel ate to traditional problems in philosophy-reference, knowledge of other minds, etc. That there is a 'problem' of reference to which a 'solu tion' must be found is, according to Putnam , th e manifestati on of a deep m et aphysical impulse within us . T his impulse h as re sulted in unintelligible questions and mistaken inquiries in all th e major disciplines of philosophy, including inquiry into the informal fallacies.
Putnaru' s proj ect is not on e of scep ticism, but is inste ad an attempt to recapture a historic al moment in our thinking, one which is prior to the 74 LoUMe Cummings onset of scientism (the form of scientism that I am concerned to examine in the present context is that of scientific reductionism). This he achieves through a process of dialectic-an examination of the presuppositions that inform opposing philosophical positions with a view to revealing the unintelligible nature of those presuppositions. In this way, Putnam is concerned to examine the unintelligibility of the dualist conception of mind, an unintelligibility which extends to the project of causal theories of reference. This unintelligibility is revealed through an examination of thecausalist's theoretical claim ('reference is a causal relation') in conjunction with the wider explanatory discourse of which it is a part. The upshot of each dialectical analysis is a greater appreciation both of what constitutes a problem in philosophy and the shape and depth of each of these problems.
I want to suggest that a similar scientism pervades the ongoing controversies of fallacy theory. The manifestations of this scientism include a reliance on dichotomies (e.g. form and content) and the imposition of unintelligible demands, such as the frequently expressed claim that fallacy inquiry must achieve a theory of fallacies. A wideranging dialectical examination of fallacy debates is as timely as that urged by Putnam in disputes between realists and anti-realists. Indeed, a precedent for the form that this examination should take can be found in Putnam's dialectical criticisms of controversies ofjust this type: 'the aim which I have in mind is to break the strangle hold which a number of dichotomies appear to have on the thinking of both philosophers and laymen' (Putnarn 1981, p. ix) .
The issues that Putnam has addressed in this regard are extensive and yet a discussion, such as that which will follow, requires that I restrict the degree to which they can be directly examined. Accordingly, I begin with a statement of aim: a case is presented for the abandonment of the form/content dichotomy in the analysis of petitio principii argument. I describe how the basis of this dichotomy lies in a certain picture we have of the relationship between mind and world. A model for the criticism of this dichotomy is provided by an examination of Putnam's challenge to 75 the causal theorist of reference. Following Putnam, I grant the causal theorist of reference the only type of explanation available to him on his account (explanation in terms of physicalistic/naturalistic relations) and then proceed to demonstrate how the causalist fails to achieve even the semblance of an explanation of reference-the causal theorist fails to explain how one particular model of the language becomes the relation of reference. This case, in addition to serving as an example of the type of argumentative strategy employed by Putnam, has as its counterpart in fallacy discussions the reductionist analysis of notions like justification in formal (syntactic) terms. I present a justification of the non-questionbegging status of a selected argument with a view to demonstrating the necessarily holistic nature of this pattern of justification. I further contend that no formalist analysis of the justification pattern of petitio argument can assimilate within its analysis the various normative and epistemic factors which properly constitute justification. Moreover, this situation is not improved in any way through the introduction of extraformalist analysis, given the way in which such an analysis is pursued in this context. I avoid an exposition of unintelligibility and of the pervasive influence of Wittgenstein on Putnam's thinking in this area. These features, while important within any detailed examination of Putnam's dialectical method, are of only indirect relevance to the more limited aim of the present context.
* * *
In his Dewey Lectures, Putnam (1994a) argues:
Early modern realism's philosophy of mind was an attempt to save some room for our everyday descriptions while fully accepting [the idea that our everyday descriptions cannot possibly apply to the things 'as they are in themselves']. According to this new philosophy of mind, our 'experience' is entirely a matter taking place within the mind (or within the brain), within, that is to say, a realm conceived of as 'inside', a realm where there are certainly no tables and chairs or cabbages or kings, a realm so disjoint from what came to be called the 'external' world that (as Berkeley insisted) it makes no sense to speak of any experience as resembling what the experience is 'of. Nevertheless, according to those philosophers who were not willing to follow Berkeley into idealism, 'external' things are the causes of our 'inner' experiences, and, while the person on the street is mistaken in thinking that he or she 'directly perceives' those things, still we 'indirectly perceive' them, in the sense of having experiences caused by them. Moreover, even color and warmth and the other 'secondary qualities' (as they came to be called) can be granted a derivative sort of reality-they do not exist as 'intrinsic properties' of the things 'in themselves', but they exist as 'relational properties', as dispositions to affect our minds (or brains) in certain ways (pp. 468-69).
In the above pa ssage Putnam describes a type of philosophical 'solu tion ' to the 'problem' of explaining the relationship of perceptual experiences to the phys ical world.I Although seven teen th century in origin, this same 'solution ' effectively exhausts the type of explanation that is traded within present-day philosophical accounts of intentionality. For while it is generally held that we can explain our perceptual interaction with the world using some suitably formulated causal mechanism, a similar mechanism is presumed to operate within our talk of thoughts referring to features of reality." Moreover, as part of these accounts it is argued that the se causal relations (1) bridge the gulf brought about by the dualist's dichotomy of the mental and the physical (a gulf over which our conceptual powers cannot extend) and (2) secure a type of objectivity, in that both perceptual experience and the referential capacity of language I III proposing a return to an Aristotelian conception of the mind and its relationship to the world , Nu ssbaum and Putnarn, in 'Changing Aristotle's Mind ' (Word< and Life) , reject the view that ther e is an y 'problem' to which we mu st find a 'solution' : 'As Aristotelians we do not di scover some th ing behind some th in g else, a hidden reality behind the com plex unity that we see and are. We find what we ar e in the appearances. And Aristotl e lells us that if we attend properly lo th e appearan ces the du alist's questions never even get going' ( I Y!J1b, p. 55).
2 Putn arn exam ines the proposals of a number of causal theorists in relat ion to reference ill 'Realism with ou t Absolu tes' ill Word< and Life .
ar e not the products of some fanciful creation on our part, but are ultim ately 'caused' by an ex ternal world. Indeed, it is by virtue of these causal relation s that we can assign content to our thoughts an d perceptual exper iences-outside of these relations, thoughts an d expe riences ar e taken to exhibit syn tactic structure only . I want to examin e thi s syntactic interface of perception and conce p tion , with a view to understanding the type of criticism that will be de velop ed again st the form/content dich ot omy. Putnarn describes th e varied nature of th ese int erfaces as follows:
In the traditi on , these 'in terfaces' ... were originally th ought of as mental .. . It is not, h owever, essential to an interface conception of either per ception or conception th at the interface be mental-in materialist ver sions, the interface can be a brain process or brain state. In Quine's version of the interface conception of perception, it is nerve endings on the surface of my body that play th e role of the in terface. In th e case of conception, the interface has recently been conc eived of as con sisting of 'm arks and noi ses' (Rorry ): alth ough th e interface is not literally 'ins id e' us on this Rortian conception, it turns out to gener at e the same problematic 'ga p' between th ough t and th e world. (T here is also a version-c-Fodor's-i-in which th e interface is sen tences, but not sen tences in a public language-marks and noises-but in a language 'inside' our brains, 'm en talese'. This is a kind of combination of the linguistic conception of the interface with the conception of the interface as 'inside the head'.) (Unpublished lecture notes).
No twiths tand in g differences in detail, each of these interfaces generates 'the sam e problematic "gap" between th ought an d the world'. Putnam Putnarn , re jects the cen tra ) tenet of metaphysical reali sm , that our mental represe n tations are in correspo nde nce with a min d-ind ependent reality. However, the two most important trends in the philosophy of mind) as attempts to bridge just such a 'gap' between the dualist's conception of the mental an d the physical. Proponents of the former type of reductionist analysis typ ically explain intentionality using a range of scientific languages in addition to that of physics: 'Reductionism , with respect to a class of asser tions (e.g. assertions abou t m ental events) is the view that assertions in that class are "made true" by facts which are outside of that class'
(Pu tn am 1981 , P: 56 ). An exam p le frequently discus sed in thi s regard is one in which though ts are 'm ade true' (given con ten t) by physical facts. 'For an other example, th e view of Bishop Berkeley th at all th ere "really is" is minds an d their sensations is redu ctionist, for it holds that sen tences about tables and ch airs and other ordinary "material objects" are actually made true by facts abou t sens a tions ' (1981 , p. 56 ) . A third form of reductionist analysis, thi s time rel ating not to truth but to ration ality, is that of cultural rel ativism: '.. . the cultural relativist's paradigm is a soft scien ce: anthropology, or linguistics, or psychology, or history, as the case may be. That re ason is whatever th e norms of the local culture determine it to be is a reductionist view inspired by the social sciences, including history' (Putnam 1983 , p . 235) . I want to argue, as indeed Putnam has argued, that the common strat egy of these approaches is one which is unintelligible in nature. In specific terms, my claim is that no coherent explan ation of th e 'facts of language'-for example, that we often assert 'There is a castle in view' j us t when th ere is a castle in view and not when an igloo is in view-ean proceed in the essentially non-intentional manner typical of the analyses de scribed above. In thi s way, consider the followin g de scription by failure of metaph ysical realism h olds a fu n d ame ntally differ ent sign ificance for these two wr iters . Pu tnarn 's respoll se is to que stion the dua lism be hin d th e metap hysical rea list pictu re , whe rea s for' Rort y the very noti on o f representation shou ld be abandone d : ' ... his [Rort y's] entire attack on trad ition al philosophy is mounted on th e basis th at the nature of reason a nd represen tat ion are n ail -p roblems, becau se th e on ly kind of truth it mak es sense to seek is to con vince one 's cultu ral pee rs ' (Pu tnam 1983, p . 235) . In fact, Rorty ha s moved from a re lativist to a de con struction ist po sition. Putnarn of one consequence of the decision to describe reference in terms of non-intentional relations:
... there are infinitely many admissible models of our language, i.e., infinitely many models which satisfy all operational and theoretical constraints. If the entities that these models consist of are thought of as mind-independent discourse-independent entities, then the claim that just one of these models is the unique 'intended' model becomes utterly mysterious. Each of these models corresponds to a reference relation. So there are infinitely many admissible reference relations, RI, R 2 , R 3 , ... Someone who believes that just one of these, say RI?, r-eally is the unique real reference relation, the reference relation, believes that the word 'reference' is attached to RI? (and not to RI, R 2 , ... ) with metaphssica!glu.e. (1983, p. 295) In the above passage, Putnam is describing a 'permutation' argument similar to that first discussed by Quine in Word and Object. The outcome of Putnam's version of this argument is that each sentence in the language can be reinterpreted in such a way that while the truth-values of whole sentences remain unchanged, the reference relations of their component terms have been extensively altered, to the degree where 'castle' can refer to motorway in one interpretation of the language, to hospital in a second interpretation, to the planet Saturn in a third interpretation, ete. Quine's response to this indeterminacy in our own language is to 'choose as our manual of translation the identity transformation, thus taking the whole language at face value' and he has it in mind that 'Reference is then explicated in disquotational paradigms analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm ' (1990, p. 52) . A different response to this indeterminacy is given by Michael Devitt (1984) . For Devitt, the true relation of reference is itself a causal connection which, for the purposes of the present analysis, is exemplified by the relation RI? above. A more recent account, that of Jerry Fodor (1990) , appeals to counterfactuals to explain reference. Fodor's counterfactuals express an asymmetrical dependence between causal statements. In this way, the referent of 'cat' is arrived at through a counterfactual of the form 'If cat s didn't cause "cat" tokenings, then ... (cat pictures, cat statues, the sound "meow", and so on) wouldn't cause "cat" tokenings either' (Putnam 1992 , p. 38) .
When Devitt discusses causal relation it is with an explanatory role in mind:
So his [the realist's] answer may include a sentence roughly like Term x is cau sally related in way A to object y and to nothing else as an explanation of another sentence x refers to y and to nothing else .
In such circumstances he will regard the reference of x as determinate. (1984, p . 189) Again:
We could have foretold that we would be able to find some causal relation between the entities, because causal relations are ubiquitous. We need to see the one we have picked out as explanatorily special. (1984, p . 87) However, the causal theorist lacks the option of selecting a causal relation which is 'explanatorily special'. To see this, we need to consider exactly what range of notions is involved in the selection of an 'explanatorily special' causal relation. Clearly, such a selection presupposes notions of appropriateness, notions which are normative in nature-after all, the relation which is explanatorily special is also the most apt)ropriate candidate for the relation of reference. Moreover, appropriateness exists as part of a larger web of normative and epi stemic notions. A causal relation is appropriate when it satisfies the explanatory function it is called upon to serve. Satisfaction presupposes notions of adRquacy, notions which must be in place in order to assess whether a particular pur/Jose, that of explanation, has been fulfilled . Now, it is just these normative and epistemic considerations which are unavailable to the cau sal theorist. He is pursuing a reductionist ana lysis-an account of the intentional from within the non-intentionalan essen tial feature of which is its rejection of all things normative. Putnaru's criticism thus turns on the causal theorist's failure to provide any intelligible explan ation of reference. The decisive point in his cha llen ge to th e causalist comes when he applies the causal theorist's claim s to a sta tem en t of the causal theorist's own position. For as Putnam con ten ds, if reference is (exp lain ed by) a causal relation, then at the very least a causal rel ati on should be able to account for the referential nature of that fact. H owever, we have just seen the Utopian nature of such a demand-no causal relation th at is acceptable to the causalist can assume th e essen tially holistic character of the notion of explanation. Yet caus al theories must ach ieve exactly this much if they are to continue in their role as an explanation of reference. It emerges that the only option available to th e causalist is to dogmatically assert that one particular model of th e language-say Rl~ju st is th e relation of reference. In doing so, ho wever, we have not explained why R I7 is the relation of reference so mu ch as we have sim ply stated that such is the case (Putnam 1983) .
It is worth examining further Putnam's challenge to the causal th eorist. I described above how a decisive point in Putnam's criticism of th e causalist was reached when the causalist was required to explain how the statemen t 'r eference is a cau sal relation' referred. This point was de scribed as decisive because it signalled a self-refutation from which the causalist had no route of escape-unless, of course, he was prepared to aban don certain cen tral features of his account, such as the claim th at causa l relation is an explana tion of reference. The form of this selfrefu tati on is th at in ord er to explain the reference of the claim 'referenc e is a causal rel ati on', the causa list must appeal to a notion of reference wider than th at of causal relation. In this way, reference cannot be a causa l relation . Hen ce, it is false that reference is a causal relation.
Self-refutation arguments of just this type form a prominent part of Putnam's dialectical strategy. A type of activity, that of explanation, has been central to the self-refutation argument of the present case. In fact , in each self-refutation argument employed by Putnam a theoretical claim is undermined by a proponent explaining or justifying it (see below) or even simply saying or thinking it. The significance of these self-refutation arguments stems from what they are able to tell us about notions such as reference. It was described above how causal relations failed as an explanation of reference, a failure which was attributed to the nonin ten tion al nature of those relations. I now want to make the stronger claim that every attempt to account for reference in this non-intentional way is doomed to failure, given that reference presupposes intentionality. This conclusio n turns on a particular understanding of language 'us e', one which Putnam attributes to the later Wittgenstein, in which to describe th e word s in a language game (think of reference as belonging to just such a language game) requires that we employ the words within that same game: 'If one wants to talk of the use of the sen tence "There is a coffee table in front of me", one has to talk about seein g and feel ing coffee tables, among other things. In short, one has to mention perceiving coffee tables' (Pu tn am 1994b, p . 283). In the same way, to proceed to discuss how the sen ten ces of our language can be about anything is to alre ady have a ma stery of a vast range of notions, including the notion of reference. Before leaving these introductory remarks to examine how the con siderations adduced within them relate to the main theme of this discussion , th e form/content dichotomy in petitio principii analysis, I exa mine a criticism of the view that I am proposing.
Ce n tral to Putnarn's criticism of cau sal theories of reference is his claim that a cau sal relation fails to account for the reference of the causalist's th eoretical claim , that referenc e is explained by a causal relati on . It m ay re asonably be objected that Putnam's criticism of causal theories of reference and my criticism , to follow, of a formal ap proach to the study of p etiti o principii-I will argue subsequ en tly that no form al (syn tactic) relati on of justificati on can justify the form al theorist's claim (Similarly, it m ay be argued that in the analysis of petitio principii to follow, I am en gaging in a level con fus ion, this time a confusion between justificati on within an argument and justification of a particular view-a formalist view-of the justification relation of an argument (in the case to follow, of petitio argu m en t.) It may also be argued that the satisfaction of th e former type of reference and ofjustification-the reference of terms and the justificati on relation within an argument-is not conditional on th e prior sa tisfac tion of the latter type of reference and of justification respectively-the reference of th e causal theory itself and the justification of a particular view of the justification relation of argument. Such an objection is consis te n t with Van Cleve 's views both of reference and of epis temic justificati on. In rel ation to reference, Van Clev e su bscribes to sema n tic superv enience, 'the thesis that sem an tic fact s supervene on nonsemantic fact s ' (1992, p . 344) . These nonsemantic facts, Van Cleve argues , while they give rise to reference, are not themselves subject to any demand concerning their own reference. So it is that Van Cleve, while he himself holds 'n o brief for the caus al theory' (p . 349), is quick to cha llen ge Putnam 's rejection of the view of Hartry Field, a rejection to the effect that a naturalistic (p ossibly a cau sal) relation cannot be, as Field claim s it is, th e relation of reference, on the grounds that a naturalistic (causal) relation can be sh own not to determinately refer:
If sem an tic phenomena ... are supervenient on natural phenomena, th en there mu st be at lea st one true principle sa tisfyin g Field's schema-a cau sal principle, as it might be , but ifnot th at, som e other principl e specifyin g the natural ba sis for reference.
Let us suppose, then, that the following is a true generation principle in semantics ... : if x bears R to y, then x refers to y. Nothing more is necessary; ... Contrary to what Putnam repeatedly insists upon, we do not have to be able to 'single out' one relation as the intended referent of'R' before the causal theory (or the R-theory) can do its job. We can do the singling out later ... but we need not do it as a precondition of the successful working of the theory. One might put the point this way: as knowledge makers need not be known, so reference makers need not be referred to (Van Cleve 1992, p. 351) .
Van Cleve views as unnecessary Putnam's demand for reference in the case of R itself. A similar claim characterises Van Cleve's account of epistemic justification-as knowledge makers, 'epistemic principles need not be known in order for knowledge to arise in accordance with them ' (1979, p. 79) . The question now is whether or not the criticism of causal accounts of reference pursued by Putnam and the criticism of a formal approach to the study of petitio principii that I will subsequently pursue can evade a critical response of the type advanced by Van Cleve.
Van Cleve cites the following criticisms by Putnam of the causal theory of reference ('MMS' and 'RTH' stand for, respectively, Meaning and the
Moral Sciences and Reason, Truth and History):
A causal theory of reference would not help, 'for how "causes" can uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how "cat" can, on the metaphysical realist picture' (MMS, p. 126); 'the reference of "x bears R to y" is itself indeterminate' (RTH, P: 45); 'it is a puzzle how we could learn to express what Field wants us to say' (RTH, p . 46). (Van Cleve 1992, p. 349) These criticisms, Van Cleve claims, constitute a "just more theory" objection' (p. 349) on the part of Putnam. I want to argue that Putnam's criticism of cau sal theories of reference is more subtle than Van Cleve's characterisation of Putnarn's criticism suggests. It will be recalled that when Devitt advances his causal theory of reference, he does so in the expectation that such a theory will serve as an explanation of reference. Now, Devitt's view is not unique in this regard. For it is the case that explanation is a central notion in all causalist accounts of reference. To understand why this is so, one need only consider the fact that causal theorists pursue an account of reference from within the perspective of metaphysical realism. From within this perspective, causal theorists, as a subgroup of metaphysical realists more generally, set about the establishment of the following chain of explanation. Their aim is to explain the success of science in terms of the reference of the theories of science to subsets of the totality of all objects. Their reductionism, particularly their predilection for physicalistic description, leads them in turn to pursue an explanation of reference in terms of a causal relation. When Putnam criticises this causal relation, it is for the reason that it fails to perform any intelligible explanatory role in relation to reference. In the first instance, the focus of Putnam's criticism is an aspect of the causalist's rational practice, that of explanation, and not an aspect of his theoretical account, as Van Cleve is suggesting is the case. It is this practice which subsequently renders the causalist's theoretical claim, that reference is explained by a causal relation, unintelligible. An understanding of how this is achieved takes us to the very core of Putnam's dialectical criticism of causal theories of reference.
I described earlier something of the holistic character of the notion of explanation-various normative and epistemic concepts were shown to be inextricably connected to this notion. I now want to argue that these concepts constitute a precondition on the very possibility of explanation, in much the same way that the laws of logic for Kant are constitutive of the possibility of thought. Where these prior concepts are absent, what emerges is not a different kind of explanation, but rather no explanation at all. Connected to the impossibility of explanation in the absence of prior normative and epistemic concepts is the unintelligibility of explanation in the absence of these concepts-prior normative and epistemic concepts confer sense on the notion of explanation. Now, the proponent of a causal explanatory relation of reference-this is, in effect, what the causal theorist is proposing through his claim that a causal relation explains reference-finds himself in the position of denying the existence of prior normative and epistemic concepts in his account of reference-no causal relation can assimilate these normative and epistemic concepts within its analysis. However, in so denying the existence of these prior concepts, the causalist is effectively denying both the possibility and the intelligibility of an explanation of the reference of terms within the causalist's theory and of an explanation of the reference of the causalist's theory itself. Of course, the impossibility of this latter type of explanation-explanation of the reference of the causal theory itselfmight well be taken to indicate that while a causal theory can give rise to reference, this theory cannot itself be subject to any demand concerning its own reference. (Van Cleve's claim, it should be noted, is that while a causal theory (or an epistemic principle in justification) need not refer (need not be known), just such a theory can refer Oust such an epistemic principle can be known).) Such a response, however, still assumes that there is a causal theory, a causal theory the reference of which cannot be explained. However, on the view that I am proposing, if an explanation of the reference of causal theories is not possible, then causal theories themselves are not possible-the concepts which make these theories possible, the normative and epistemic concepts which are integral to the notion of explanation, are absent in the case where an explanation of the reference of these theories is not possible (owing, of course, to the causal framework within which such an explanation is pursued) .
It thu s emerges that the charge of level confusion against Putnam, and against my account of petitio principii to follow, finds no target. What initially appears to be a point about two different types of reference-the reference of terms which are subsumed by a causal theory of reference and the reference of a causal theory itself-is more accurately a point about certain preconditions for reference, preconditions which hold equally for all instances of this notion. I have identified certain normative and epistemic concepts as forming a precondition on the very possibility and intelligibility of reference. I have also argued that the causal theorist's account of reference, in lacking any sari of 'conceptual space' for these normative and epistemic concepts, is, in the final analysis, impossible and unintelligible. Of course, none of what I hav e said is intended as a rejection of Van Cleve's characterisation of Putnarn's early criticisms of causal theories of reference. But I do think th at Putnarn's recent, and indeed not so recent, view of causal theories of reference is more likely to frame th e problem with these theories as being one of their unintelligibility, not as being one of the indeterminacy of any causal relation advanced by the causalist as the relation of reference.
* * *
The following proposals of Woods and Hull are typical of the on goin g dialectic in the an alysis of petitio principii":
A further advantage of this sort of formal approach is that it demonstrates that, and th e extent to which, possession or lack of target-properties (e.g. circularity) is not a matter of parochial seman tic status, and not a matter of parochial contextual and pragmatic features. (Woods 1980, P: 58) The fallacy of reasoning in vicious circles does not belong to this class offallacies [formal fallacies]. Instead it is an example of what logicians call a material fallacy . In diagnosing material fallacies both content and 4 Of all the informal fallacies, petitio principii is the fallacy which has been most extensively d im m ed in the literature. Johnson and Blair (1985) describe how 'O ver the past live years researchers have been relining the accou n ts of th e informal fallacies. Begging th e question con tinues to be a pre occupation .. . ' (p . 186) . The five year period to which Johnson and Blair refer is from I\l78 to 1983. This same preoccupation is again eviden t in Sch mid t' s (1987) bibliograph y of the fallacies. Begging the qu estion accounts for 28 of the entrie s, ad homin em 17, vagueness 7. genetic fallacy 7, composition and division 5, ad baculum 5. ad igno ra n tiarn 3, ad POPUhlll1 3. ad verecundiam 3, ignoratio elenchi 2, man y questions 2, ambigu ity 2, ad misericord iam 1, gambl er 's fallacy I, and non causa pro causa J. A similar distribution is to be found in Hans en 's (1990) informal logic bibliography-begging the question (31) is second only to the categor y 'all fallacies other than the 'ad ' fallacies and begging the questi on' (40). Ad hominem and tu quoqne arguments account for 24 of Hansen's en tries, with ad verecundiam 10, and 'ad ' fallacies other than ad hominem and ad verecund iam 13. the use to which the argument is being put play central r oles. (Hull 1967, p. 177) Here Woods an d Hull are representative of two frequently enc ountered approaches to the analysis of petitio, th e on e formalistic an d the oth er extra-formalistic" in nature. Notwithstanding differences in emphasis and terminology, it is generally accepted that the premises of an argument function by providing some degree of supportive warrant for the conclusion. In this regard, arguments have been vari ously de scribed as committed to a principle of 'evidential priority', in which th e premises are prior to, or better known than, the conclusion." This principle, while characteristic of m ost typ es of argum ent, is clearly violated in p etitio principii reasoning-in this case the premises cannot be evidentially pri or to the conclusion, since a proposition id entical to, and hence as unknown as, that conclusion is contained within the premise-set? It is 5 It could , of cou r se, be argued that formal th eori es have been constructed of the very no tion s that I am here describing as 'extra-forma listic', e.g. Katz's theory of mea ning. (Pu tnam has criticised such the or ies for failing to accou nt for an y philosophica lly signi ficant no tion. In re latio n to Block's Co nceptua l Role Seman tics, he argues: 'I ha ve re marke d a number of times that to iden tify mean ing with "conc ep tual role" would amount to a total cha nge of topi c, and not to an account of me aning ' (1988 , P: 53) .) Through u se of 'extraformalistic' I in ten d only to convey a sense of levels of linguistic or ganisation dis tinct fro m that of sen tence structure. 6 Walton and Batte n (1984) di scuss evid ential pri ority in relation to pe titio argumen t in the following way: 'The assumption is that th e eviden tiar y wellknownn ess of A, in order to make A of utility as a premiss, mus t be prior to th at of B. On ce the deduction is gran ted however, the value of B sho uld be adj usted upwards to a plau sibility valu e equa l to (and not gre ater than) A. On ce A has been so utili sed as a p rem iss for B however, B could never be used as a premi ss in an argumen t that has A as a conclusion . Reason : to be useful as a pr emiss , the value of B must be greater th an that of A. But as was just shown above, the value of B should not be gr eat er th an that of A, if A has been u sed as a premiss for B in a previous deduc tion . Thus argui ng in a circle, from A to B, and th en subseque ntl y from B to A, violates some re quirem en t of evide n tial priority' (p . 154). 7 The par ticular concep tion of pet itio presented here is di scussed by Wood s an d Walton (1982) in terms of two distinctions: a dependency versu s an equiualence conception of th e fallacy and an epistemic as opposed to a gam e-theoretic mod el of an alysis. While the account in the text is most accurately re presented by the Woods-Walton d escrip tions of the equiuolence conce p tion and the epistemic mo de l, th ese au tho rs are at pai ns to emphasise wha t they take to be th e equiualence basis of the dependency conce p tion . They d escribe th is as a rejectio n of t.h eir ori ginal dependen cy/equiv alence distinction as detailed in Wood s and Walt.on (1975 I want to examine the type of formal approach described above by Woods. At a slightly earlier point in the same article, Woods describes certain prerequisites for the formal treatment of a body of knowledge:
Perhaps it may be assumed that a body of knowledge is non-trivially eligible for formal treatment when (1) the objects of theory enter into interesting systematic interconnections expressible in functional or quasi-functional ways, and (2) such interconnections obtain or not, as the case may be, under semantic suppression ofthe connected items. (1980, p.57) In relation to petltlO argument, this formal approach results in 'Arguments of the form "p, therefore p" ...
[the] formal validity [of which] is impeccably reflected in standard first-order logic' (Woods and Walton, 1975, p. 107) . My point is not to deny the formal validity of 'p, therefore p', but to indicate that the formal validity of this case rests on the fact that one and the same proposition forms both the premise and the conclusion of the argument. Moreover, sameness in this context is not the sameness of graphemes, the sense in which premise p is the same grapheme as conclusion p, nor is it the sameness of grapheme sequences, the sense in which the grapheme sequence which forms premise p is the same as the grapheme sequence which forms conclusion p. Sameness is used here in relation to propositions, linguistic constructions which admit of truth or falsity through the representation (or lack of representation, as the case may be) of certain states of affairs. Also, sameness presupposes the notion of difference, a difference not of graphemes and of grapheme sequences, but of the states of affairs represented by propositions. The crux of the problem for the formalist is this: what does an ability to distinguish states of affairs come to other than an ability to refer through the use oflanguage? Yet reference is our paradigm semantic notion, not to mention the related notions of representation and truth. Clearly, the formal theorist is not able to achieve the suppression of semantics required by his approach.
The objection just outlined is an objection against one type of formal method, that of formal logic. Criticism took the form of the claim that this use of formal techniques, far from operating under the suppression of semantic notions, actually presupposed such notions. One response to this claim could be to emphasise the availability of other formal methods, methods which, it may be argued, are less susceptible to a criticism of this sort. In this way, I now turn to examining a further kind of formal approach, that pursued by certain branches of linguistics.
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Linguistic analyses have featured in various ways in discussions of petitio argument. Irving Copi (1972) , for example, looks to the orthography for a criterion for the identification of petitio principii, only to reject any orthographic basis for this fallacy:
If one assumes as a premiss for his argument the very conclusion he intends to prove, the fallacy committed is that of petitio principii, or begging the question. If . the proposition to be established is formulated in exactly the same words both as premiss and as conclusion, the mistake would be so glaring as to deceive no one. Often, however, two formulations can be sufficiently different to obscure the fact that one and the same proposition occurs both as premiss and conclusion. (p. 83) In this case, an argument is taken to beg the question when the orthographic form of the conclusion (the sequential arrangement of graphemes) is replicated by one of the premises. Additional formal (syntactic) descriptions can be formulated on the basis of the morphological and grammatical structures of the proposition. The issue then becomes one of assessing the adequacy of orthographic identity, as well as these other syntactic criteria, to the task of petitio analysis.
I; J avoid d iscussion of particular theories of grammatical syntax. etc., as the se are of limited relevan ce to th e more general nature of my accoun t.
Mind and Bod y. Form and Con te n t: Ho w not to do Petitio Principii An alysis
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As part of this assessment it will be instructive to examine the formalist's position in the light of the dualist claims that have been raised thus far. It was discussed above how, in the absence of extrinsic causal rel ations, the philosopher of mind was compelled to describe perceptual experiences and thoughts in terms of a certain intrinsic syntactic stru cture. The picture presented was on e in which our cognitive powers exten ded as far as a conceptual interface which, while syntactically analysable, was devoid of all content (meaning). Now, it is the specific claim of the formal theorist of petitio principii that a syntactic description of thi s interface is alone necessary and sufficient for the analysis of petitio. However, such a view fails our clearest understanding of what constitutes petitio reasoning. For it is unexceptional for propositions exhibiting identical syntactic structures to appear as pr emise and conclusion in a non-question-begging argument:"
The castle is larger than the mansion. The man sion is larger than the cottage. Therefor e, the castle is larger th an the cottage.
Here th e morphological and grammatical identity of conclusion and premises is insufficient to warrant a description of this argument as que stion-begging. 10 Moreover, it emerges that syntactic identity of 92 Louise Cumming. premise and conclusion fails as even a necessary condition of petitio argument:
[To] allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments. (Whately 1836, p . 223) Described by Whately (1836) as question-begging, the above argument contains a single premise which is syntactically distinct from the conclusion.
Yet for all this the formalist may respond that a simple multiplication of syntactic criteria will suffice to accoun t for all cases of petitio argument. Here, however, the formalist has misunderstood the nature of the objector's criticism, that no sense can even be given to such syn tactically described relations as a premise's being confirmed etc., in the absence, which is so central a tenet of the formal approach, of prior normative and epi stemic concepts. The proof of this will be that for every syntactic description intended to coincide with the confirmation of a premise, some wider notion of justification or warrant will be presupposed!' by that syntactic description. In this regard, consider be so glaring as to deceive no one' (Copi 1972, 4th edn) , In the final analysis our choice of a criter ion of syntacti c identity must be on e which preserves the idea that th e success of this fallacy requires that its assume d premise remain undetected . In keeping with the theme of the text, ou r notion of what constitutes success for this fallacy is itself part of a wider understanding of petitio argument. 11 The basis of this position can be found in the meaning holism arguments of W. V. Quine. In 'Epistemology Naturalized', Quine explains the problem for the positivists' redu ctionist approach to meaning as follows: 'H ow is this inaccessibility [of the empirical meanings of typical statemen ts about the external world] to be explained? Simpl y on the ground that th e experiential implications of a typical statement about bodies are too compl ex for finite axiomatization, however lengthy? No : I have a different explanation. It is that the typical statement abo ut bodi es has no fund of experiential implications it can call its own. A substantial mass of theory, taken together, will commonly have experiential impli cations; this is how we make verifiable predictions . We may not be able to explain why we arrive at theories which mak e successful predi ctions , but we do arriv e at such theories' 93 again the first example discussed above. There it was argued that syntactic identity was insufficient to warrant a description of this argument as question-begging. It was also indicated, if somewhat briefly, that syn tactic identity failed 'our clearest understanding of what constitutes petitio reasoning'. Moreover, in the same context I described this understanding as 'prean alytic', in an attempt to convey what I see as its intuitive basis. Now, given thi s preanalytic understanding, one might proceed to justify the assessment of the first example as non-questionbegging in the following way."
It appears unproblematic to describe an argument as questionbegging wh en one of its premises depends in whole or in part upon its conclusion for supportive warrant. Yet this clearly fails to accord with a certain understanding we have of the evidential relationships at work in the first argument above. For we can conceive of how perceptual evidence would confirm the premise 'th e castle is larger than the mansion'-we can simply look and see that such is the case (we may, of course, need to perform various measurements, etc.), What we cannot imagine, however, is how simply assuming the truth of the conclusion can contribute in any significant way to a j ustification of thi s premise. For the conclusion in conjunction with the second premise (a known premise) is insufficient to justify the proposition 'the castle is larger than the mansion'-this proposition mu st itself be assumed in order to assimilate the information contained separately in the second premise and conclusion. Yet it is this very proposition which we are attempting to justify. The latter (1\/6\/, p . 79). Given th e need for a notion of same ness of meaning in petitio analysis, the convergen ce of petitio th eory on the issues of meaning holism is to be exp ected. 12 At this basic level of justification th e role of notions such as confirmation and evidence has been left delib er ately undeveloped (' ... we can conceive of how perceptual evidence would confirm th e pr em ise .. .'), In thi s way, I avoid p re-empting later discussion of the holistic nature of these concepts and , more impor tan tly, I represent this justification as an initial stage in petitio inqu iry (see footnote 9).
Louise Gum ming., p attern of justification is that of a circle, in sh ort th e fallacy of begging the question.
Putting aside a clear difference in direction of an alysis, IS I wan t to argue that the formal theorist of petitio can n ot avail himself of th e above justificatory discourse. It is not th e case that the concepts of this justification are unacceptable to the formalist-it is no part of his position to reject th e id ea that we can have evidence for a premise or even that som e evidence exceeds other evidence in point of plausibility , rel evance, ete. It is rather that no syntactic approach can assimilate with in its analysis the essentially holistic nature of this justification. Consider, for example, the interplay of epistemic an d normative factors within the above justification. There the confirmation of the premise 'the castle is larger than the mansion' proceeded on the ba sis of perceptual evid en ce. I now want to suggest th at the selection' of suc h evidence is guided in large part by considerations of relevance, such th at measurements of hei ght and the ob serv ati on of a sh oo tin g star are judged to be relev ant and irrelevant re spectively to th e confirmation of thi s premise. However, rel evance is not an isolated notion but one which is further dependent on the concept of meaning-to understand the relevance of evidence x is to understand the way in which th e con ten t of x bears upon the content of a prop osition y. The dependency of relevance extends still further into an assessment of th e purpose for which thi s evid en ce is adduced. This is not 13 Of cou rse, the fo rm alist will have a prean alytic understandin g of thi s fir st exam ple as qu estion -begging and he will p roduce argumen ts to th at effect du ring an alysis (while I also believe that th ese argumen ts will fail to valida te hi s preanalytic under standi n g, my stra tegy here is to use th e formalist's justificato ry p ra ctice in d efeat of h is claim s). However , given that we share th e sam e conception of what con stitutes p et itio r easoning (otherwise we ar e not even discu ssing th e sam e subj ect), a con ten tion, which I con sid er to be un problematic, is th a t sim ilar conce pts will emerge in th e j us tificati ons ad vanced by each of us in sup po r t of our resp ective position s. This foll ows fro m th e fact that suc h j us tificatio ns can be assessed as di spl aying p ositive or negative values alon g vario us p aramete rs, e .g. th e dependency of a pr em ise on a conclusio n . A nega tive value for a parame ter d oes not imply the ab sen ce of that parameter within justificator y dis course: analysi s of a non-question -begging argument rould quite reasonably include a d escription of the p remises as re ceiving sup portive warra nt wh ich is i1u1epe1ldelll of th e con clusion.
'pur pose ' in some narrow sense, in which evidence is selected for its relevance to th e confirmation of a particular proposition or premise, the sense that we have just discu ssed. For it is also the case that the larger inquiries of which this confirmation is but one component can also determine what is to constitute relevance within that context. For example, measurements of height might be irrelevant to the confirma tion of the premise 'th e castle is larger than the mansion', when this confirma tion is part of a quantity surveyor's inquiry, an inquiry in which th e size of a building is assessed in terms of the area of land that it covers. In fact, th e assessment of evidence as relevant to the confirmation of a prop osition and as relevant to the wider inquiry of which that confirmation is a part is an assessment which is distinctly normative in nature-in both cases, a statement is being made concerning the adequacy of evidence to particular tasks. Moreover, the factors discussed thus far would feature equally in an analysis of the second example above, where a relation of synonymy (sameness of meaning) between premise and conclu sion is intimately connected with the normative assessment of this argumen t as fallacious . Also, the identification of fallacy presupposes a wider purpose of argument, the proof of a previously unknown proposition , a purpose wh ich has not been fulfilled in the case of thi s second example. In sh ort, the above justificatory discourse can only be under stood in terms of an entire network of concepts, and not some syn tactically de scribed component of that network. 14 Of course, the formalist may concede the holistic nature of the above justificat ory discourse, but then deny that such a justification plays any role in petitio argu men t-after all, his concern is to explain syntactic idlmtily be tween premise and conclusion, not this holistic notion of justification . But insofar as he is prepared to discuss identity in relation to a premise and a con clusion , he must further countenance a wider con text of argument along with all of its attendant concepts. The relation of Louise Curnrnings identity is at least as problematic for the formal theorist of petitio as was the earlier notion ofjustification. Now on the basis of the above discussion, I want to argue that justification is a complex notion, one which owes its possibility to the prior existence of a range of interrelated concepts. This range of concepts, I want to argue further, confers sense on the notion ofjustification, that is, it is only on the basis of our having some prior understanding of what constitutes notions such as relevance and purpose within the context of argument that we can even claim to make sense of the notion of justification within argument. However, where on the view of argumentative justification that I am proposing, a vast range of concepts not only constitutes the possibility of the notion ofjustification, but also determines the sense of this notion, the formalist sees either no role or only a superfluous role for these concepts within his account of justification. Justification, the formalist will argue, is a circumscribed concept, and as such is not dependent on other concepts either for its own possibility or for its sense. Given the circumscribed character of justification on the formalist's account of this notion, a syntactic approach, which operates on 'objects of theory' which are 'under semantic suppression' (cf. Woods (1980) above), is ideally suited, according to the formalist, to the analysis of the notion ofjustification in argument. This last claim of the formalist's is unproblematic indeed-if it is in fact the case that justification can be circumscribed, that is, can be shown to be independent of all other concepts, then a syntactic approach, and a syntactic approach alone, is appropriate to the analysis of the notion of argumentative justification. However, what is problematic, I believe, is the formalist's contention that a circumscribed concept ofjustification is even possible. In order to demonstrate not only the impossibility of a circumscribed concept of justification, but also the 'llnintelligibility of such a concept-I described earlier that no sense can even be given to such syntactically described relations as a premise's being confirmed etc., in the absence .. . of prior normative and epistemic concepts-the justificatory practice of the formalist must be examined.
Such an examination was undertaken above, in the case of the petitio the orist's attempt to justify his normative assessment of an argument. This normative assessm en t de alt with the issu e of whether an argument was question-begging or non-question-begging in nature, an issue which provided, in effect, an opportunity for the analysis of the justification relation within argu men t. Now, in attempting to justify his normative assessmen t of an argument, the petitio theorist was shown to appeal to a range of concep ts, concepts which are normally implicit in the justification relation of an argument. These concepts are not unique to a particular theoretical po sition, but instead underpin the normative and epis ternic j udgemen ts engaged in by both the formalist and the nonform alist in an attempt to justify the normative assessment of an argument. These concepts, I want to argue, are strictly necessary in nature-they represent a precondition on the very possibility and intelligibility of the notion of j us tification . Something of the necessary character of these concep ts can be demonstrated by examining the impact of their absence on the notion of justification. In th e absence of the se concep ts, a justification of the normative assessment of an argu me nt is not possible-we can' only assert that a particular argument is question-begging or is n ot question-begging (an d even thi s is doubtful, given that assertion, on the view that I am proposing, presupposes the same normative and epistemic concepts that are presupposed by justification) but we cannot say why an argument is question-begging or is not question-begging. Also in the absence of these concepts, no sense can be made of th e notion of justification in the case of a normative assessme nt of an argument-justification is only recognisable as such in the presence of concep ts which make it possible to distinguish thi s notion from closely rel ated notions such as explanation. In short, by describing these concep ts as a precondition on the very possibility an d intelligibility of the notion of justification, I am claiming th at in their absence we are not dealing with a different notion of justification; rather we are not dealing with justification at all.
In the same way, I want to argue that the formalist's justification of his central theoretical claim-that a syntactic analysis of the justification relation of petitio argument is possible-is a justification which presupposes epistemic and normative concepts, in fact presupposes the same epistemic and normative concepts which were shown above to be presupposed by the relation ofjustification within an argument (if we are talking about justification at all, this last claim must be true). Yet it isjust at this point in the formalist's account, when the formalist comes to a justification of his own theoretical claim, that the self-refuting nature of that account becomes evident. For if, as the formalist is claiming, a syntactic analysis of the justification relation of question-begging argument and, by logical extension, of non-question-begging argument, is possible, then at the very least a syntactic analysis of the justification relation of the argument which is required in order to establish the formalist's theoretical claim, must be possible. However, as the discussion to date is intended to show, just such a syntactic analysis is not possible: through its denial of the necessary priority of epistemic and normative concepts within its analysis, the syntactic approach is effectively denying the very concepts which constitute a precondition on the possibility and the intelligibility of the notion of justification. The formal theorist of justification is faced with a dilemma which is not unlike the dilemma which is faced by the causal theorist of reference: he must either concede the impossibility and the unintelligibility of his central theoretical claim-that a syntactic analysis of the justification relation of questionbegging argument is possible-or he can declare his central theoretical claim to be justified, but in so doing he is making use of a notion of justification which is not available to him from within his syntactic approach. The formal theorist's only route of escape from this dilemma is to forego even the possibility of a syntactic analysis ofjustification, and to pursue in its place a holistic analysis of this notion, an analysis in which the 'open texture' ofjustification is emphasised.
I want to summarise at this stage what I am presenting as unacceptable within the formalist's position. The formalist is proposing a form al analysis of p etitio principii, an analysis in terms of the stru ctural pr op erties of the component propositions of this fallacy. In specific terms, this amounts to the claim that syntactic structures can simply sup plan t notions like evidence and justification, notions which are central to an understanding of petitio as a type of argumentative failure. It ha s been my contention that no analysis of intentional notions such as evidence and justification can proceed in the manner envisaged by the formalist. I demonstrated this in the following way. I examined how justificatory discourse, in fact the very justificatory discourse u sed by the formalist to validate his theoretical claim, appealed to an entire network of con cepts and I further suggeste d that n o syntactic relation could both coincide with the 'o p en texture' of su ch a justification and comply with th e restrictive nature of a syntactic analysis. The critical challenge is again that of a self-refu tation '<e-if the justification pattern of petitio argume n t is a syn tactic relation, then a syn tactic relation fails as a justification of this fact. In this way, justification cannot be a syntactic relation. Hence, it is false that justification is a syntactic relation. This self-refutation is the direct result of the attempt to pursue an explanation of intentional notions in strictly 'non-intentional (in thi s case , syn tactic) terms. I ha ve called thi s project one of reductionism and hav e indicated th at I view it as being fundamentally misconceived, given that an explanation of intentionality must first make use of intentional notions (cr. 'use' in later Wittgenstein). It is with these considerations in mind that I now turn to the claims of the extra-formalist.
For the extra-formalist, content (mean in g) emerges as an essential concept in the an alysis of p etitio argument. As such , the extra-formalist is concerned to explain what he views as the question-begging nature of the second example above in terms of a synonymy relation between premise and conclusion. Within the con text of a dualist conception of mind 16 _a 15 Putnarn devel op s a sim ilar self-refutation criti cism aga ins t logical p ositivism in 'Two conceptions of ration ality' in Reason. Trut h mu} History. 16 Putnam has argued that thi s particular con ception of mind represents a lar gel y uni n terrupted line o f tho ug h t since certai n d evelopmen ts in empiricism . For a d iscussion o f lOO Louise Cummings presupposition of both the extra-formalist's and the formalist's positions-the extra-formalist's notion of content amounts to a claim about the existence of causal links. In this way, it is held that content can be explained in terms of a causal mechanism, one in which various interfaces, themselves syntactically described, are causally dependent on (are 'caused' by) features of reality. 'Causal connection' has already been discussed within the context of Devitt's response to the permutation (model-theoretic) arguments of Putnam. The conclusion to emerge from this discussion was that causal connection failed to 'single out' a unique relation of reference and, a fortiori, failed to address the problem of referential indeterminacy, the resolution ofwhich had been its very raison d'etre. I suggested that the basis of this failure lay in the non-intentional nature of the naturalistic/physicalistic relations which were called upon as a causal explanation of reference. Given his commitment to a causalist form of explanation, the extra-formalist is similarly at a loss to account for his notion of meaning. If he includes within his explanation of meaning any object or state of affairs which stands in a physical relation to a thought or perceptual experience (a causal link is, after all, a type of physical relation), then causes will emerge in the explanation of the content of a thought which are in no intelligible sense part of that thought's meaning. If, on the other hand, the extra-formalist attempts to restrict the causes that he is prepared to countenance in relation to the meaning of a thought, then the very fact that he is able to do so indicates that he must alread~be in possession of a prior concept of meaning. Then given the intentional nature of his explanation, the extra-formalist can no longer claim that he is pursuing a non-intentional account of meaning.
As further illustration of these factors, consider a situation in which you are preparing an exhibition on English architecture in the Middle Ages. At one stage in your research of this topic, the thought that 'the what he takes to be the origin of the mind/body problem, see 'How Old Is the Mind?' in Words and Life. IDI castle is larger than the mansion' comes to mind. If we were to pursue a causalist explanation of the meaning of this thought, a large number of scenarios-a drawing in a child's picture book, a piece of text in a historical volume, the actual estate of a French nobleman-eould enter into this account, and no one of these situations could assume greater significance in this explanation than the others. Yet, as a matter of fact, your only causal interaction in this case is with the historical volume. Of course, it may be argued that only causal relations of the relevant type should feature in an assessment of meaning. However, given previous discussion about the relationship between relevance and meaning, it appears that if we are able to state in what a relevant cause would consist, then meaning has not been explained, but simply presupposed. The difficulty with causalist accounts of meaning is not that there are no links of this nature between our mental experiences and thoughts on the one hand and features of reality on the other, but that there are too many such links and we lack any method of singling out the appropriate causal relation-any method, that is, which does not itself make use of the notion-to-be-explained.!?
The extra-formalist may respond at this point by changing the locus of his causalist account of meaning. He may argue that by including sense data-the essential feature of which is that they are contained within the mind/brain-in a causalist explanation of meaning, the multiplication of causal states, which vitiated his original claims, could then be avoided. However, given the syntactic nature of these sense data;" it is difficult to see how this particular move avoids any of the problems described above. For it is the case that any sense datum that we would 17 'Two philosophical perspectives' in Reason, Truth and History and 'Realism without Absolutes' in Words and Life address these issues. 18 Traditionally, sense data have been viewed as constituting an unconceptualised interface between the inner processes of mind and the entities of the external world. Their supposed unconceptualised nature encouraged the acceptance of the view that sense data guaranteed the objectivity of the knowledge based upon them. Within the present context, in appealing to sense data, themselves syntactically analysable, to explain meaning, the similarity with the formalist's analysis of meaning and other intentional notions is clear.
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causally countenance with respect to a thought must itself interact with a vast background of linguistic knowledge. In this way, we can affirm 'the castle is larger than the mansion', because a certain arrangement of sense data is observed to occur. Yet such an affirmation is itself dependent on our knowing the signij"zcance of these data. As before, meaning is presupposed rather than explained.
I contend that the arguments advanced in the present context indicate the need to abandon the form/content dichotomy in the analysis of petitio principii. Also, I take these same arguments to defeat any position" that has as its basis the dualist conception of mind that has been discussed here in relation to petitio reasoning. As indicated above, it is part of this dualism that our conceptual powers cannot extend as far as objects of reality, that an interface exists between entities of the mind and of the external world. The reductionist, in attempting to bridge the gulf created by this interface, pursues an explanation of intentionality from within a dualistic conception of the physical. In this way, the links extending outwards (to reality) and inwards (to thoughts and beliefs) from the interface are held to be strictly causal (non-intentional) in nature. It has been the purpose of this discussion to demonstrate that it is the non-intentional nature of these causal links and interfaces that ultimately invalidates the claims of both the formalist and the extraformalist. For in order to describe the meaning of a premise or the way in which a premise is justij"zed, we must first make use of intentional notions, in fact the intentional notions of meaning and justification, in the very language that we employ. The indeterminacy" which emerged from the analyses above is the direct result of a failure to recognise this fact."
In conclusion, I want to sketch briefly what I consider to be the way forward in petitio principii analysis, a way forward which has itself been instrumental in rejecting the form/content dichotomy. In examining issues of form and content in the current discussion, the focus of analysis was upon the type of justification and explanation advanced by the formalist and extra-formalist respectively in defence of their claims. Indeed, the very basis of the rejection of this dichotomy lay in our understanding that a type of justificatory and explanatory failure had occurred, for example, that the only way in which the formalist and the extra-formalist could even begin to make their claims precise required that they make use of the very notions to which they were fundamentally opposed. Now, the true value of this type of dialectical'" inquiry consists in the changes that it effects within our understanding of the nature of certain problems, such as, in the present context, in the way in which we view notions like evidence and justification. These different and, I would argue, improved ways of thinking about such concepts could facilitate discussion of related issues, for example, could facilitate discussion of the issue of the conditions under which petitio principii, normally naturalistic connections between the word 'reference' and R 17 ; it is the idea that one of these declares itself to have the honor of making R I7 be the relation of reference independently from all operational and theoretical constraints that is entirely unintelligible' (Putnam, 1983. p. 296) . 21 'Given the lack of any rational connection between the surface irritations and what is outside (or inside) the skin, it is not to be wondered at that language ends up without any determinate reference to reality' (Putnam I994b, p. 282) . ('Surface irritations' refers to stimulations of nerve endings in Quine's model oflanguage.) 22 The dialectical nature of Putnam's investigations is dearly evident. James Conant, in the introduction to Words and Life, describes this particular element in Putnam's thought: 'Some of them [Putnam' s essays] begin with a dialectical overview of a philosophical controversy (often in order to try to bring out how the crucial presuppositions are ones which both parties to the dispute share). The proximate goal of these essays therefore is not to attempt to have the last word about a philosophical problem, but rather to give the reader a sense of the shape and the depth of the problem-of how, for example, in a particular philosophical dispute, thesis and counter-thesis bear one another's stamp and how each of the pair comes with its own false bottom, hiding the true dimensions of the problem from view' (p . xiii). It has been a contention of this discussion that the presuppositions shared by both the formalist and the extra-formalist have their bases in a dualist conception of mind. considered to be a fallacy of argument, represents an acceptabl e form of argument. These are issues to which more conventional forms of analy sis have been applied with only limited success. To date, this move in the direction of a dialectical approach to the study of fallacie s has been limited in extent. However, the first signs of such a move are beginning to emerge (Levi, 1994) .
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